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Abstract Statements on conflicts of interest provide important information for
readers of scientific papers. There is now compelling evidence from several fields that
papers reporting funding from organizations that have an interest in the results often
generate different findings from those that do not report such funding.We describe the
findings of an analysis of correspondence between representatives of a major soft
drinks company and scientists researching childhood obesity. Although the studies
report no influence by the funder, the correspondence describes detailed exchanges on
the study design, presentation of results and acknowledgement of funding. This raises
important questions about the meaning of standard statements on conflicts of interest.
Keywords Conflict of interest  Competing interest  Public health  Soft drinks 
Childhood obesity
Introduction
In an ideal world, scientific research would be entirely free from bias, with factors
such as the source of funding of the authors playing no role in the design of a study,
how it is analysed and how the findings are presented. Unfortunately, this is not
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always the case, and a growing body of work, especially meta-analyses, have shown
that the source of funding may be an important determinant of the results, while
other research, such as analyses of documents obtained from the tobacco industry,
has revealed clear evidence of influence by the funders of research.
This has led scientific journals to require authors to complete statements listing
any competing or conflicting interests. A conflict of interest is considered to exist
where ‘‘professional judgment concerning a primary interest (such as patients’
welfare or the validity of research) may be influenced by a secondary interest (such
as financial gain or personal rivalry)’’ [1]. Thus, conflict-of-interest statements,
which should list funding sources, have come to play a fundamental role in
managing potential conflicts in scientific research. Their utility, however, depends
on the extent to which they accurately report not just who funded research but what
role they played. It is common for studies that acknowledge funding to report that
‘‘the funder had no influence on the study’’. But what does this actually mean?
Answering this question is not straightforward, for several reasons. First,
exchanges between researchers and funders are often hidden from view, making it
impossible to ascertain whether there really was no influence and, if there was, what
form it took. Conflict-of-interest statements are self-reported and concerns about
perceived bias may encourage researchers to downplay the funder’s role. Second,
the nature of influence is not always observable. Theories of power differentiate
three aspects [2, 3]. One is sometimes referred to as ‘‘hard power’’, where one party
instructs another or exerts coercion. This would occur if the funder insisted on
changes to study design, for example. Another is ‘‘soft power’’, where no formal
demands are made but one party seeks to please the other. Thus, a researcher may
anticipate what the funder would want to see, without being told explicitly, perhaps
because of a belief that this would encourage future funding. The third is
manipulation, where both parties come to share a set of beliefs about an issue, such
as what answers to a problem are or are not acceptable. This is a more radical
dimension, more difficult to observe, and involves shaping a party’s cognitions and/
or dispositions.
Previous studies have shown that the source of funding, as disclosed in papers, is
associated with the findings of research. For example, clinical trials in psychiatry
found that those where at least one author reported a financial conflict of interest
were 4.9-fold more likely to report positive results than those that did not [4].
Another meta-analysis of systematic reviews conducted in the field of sugar-
sweetened beverages found that those with food industry funding were five times
more likely to report no positive association between weight gain and obesity than
those not reporting funding [5]. Another analysis found that industry-funded
reviews were more likely to suggest evidence of a causal relation between sugar-
sweetened beverages and that the weight gain was weak [6], and another that
industry funding of reviews of research on artificial sweeteners was associated with
study findings [7]. Yet another found that the only studies finding an adverse effect
of smoking bans on revenues in the hospitality industry were funded by the tobacco
industry [8]. However, the reasons underlying these correlations with industry
sponsorship are unclear.
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Case-study
Here we take advantage of a case-study where we look beneath the surface of
disclosure of conflict-of-interest statements to better understand the relationship
between an industry sponsor and public health academics. In this case, we focus on
researchers in the United States (US), using emails obtained through the Freedom of
Information requests (FOI) in the state of Louisiana. In some countries, individuals
have a legal right to ask public bodies, which may include public universities, to
reveal documentary material that they hold on particular issues. While there are
usually many exceptions, such as national security, or personal information, or
where finding and retrieving the material would involve excessive cost, a public
body receiving such a Freedom of Information request is usually required to
disclose the documents, or explain why it is not doing so, within a defined number
of days. The title of the pertinent law in the state of Louisiana is the Louisiana
Public Records Act (La. R.S. 44:1 et seq.).
Our analysis focuses on a contested area, childhood obesity, where the food
industry has a clear interest in the results of scientific research. The food industry
has strongly opposed public health interventions such as taxes on sugar-sweetened
beverages and emphasizes the importance of physical activity as a solution to
obesity, diverting attention from the role of unhealthy diet [9]. Prominent public
health actors, such as the new United States CDC director, have seen Coca-Cola as
an ally in the fight against obesity [10].
Specifically, we investigate the Coca-Cola-funded International Study of
Childhood Obesity, Lifestyle and the Environment (ISCOLE), among the largest
multi-country studies of factors driving childhood obesity. The ISCOLE began in
2012, when Coca-Cola awarded a $1 million contract to the Pennington Biomedical
Research Center to coordinate the project. In total, Coca-Cola invested $6,426,000
in the ISCOLE [11]. Its primary aim was to determine relationships between
lifestyle and childhood obesity across countries; it included 6000 ten-year-old
children from 12 countries in five major geographical regions of the world [12]. At
the time of writing, it has produced at least 40 peer-reviewed publications
(Supplementary table 1).
Of these 40, 13 were in a supplement to the International Journal of Obesity,
which while noting support from Coca Cola, make no mention of whether it was
involved in aspects of the study design etc.. Two other papers included a similar
statement. Of the remainder, 24 report that ‘‘The funder had no role in the design
and conduct of the study, the collection, management, analysis and interpretation of
the data, or preparation, review and approval of the manuscript’’ or some close
variant making the same point (Box 1). One paper could not be retrieved.
Here we assess this statement through an ‘ethnography of emails’ regarding the
design, conclusions and publications, as revealed in correspondence between the
Principal Investigators of the ISCOLE, Timothy Church and Peter T. Katzmarzyk,
of Pennington Biomedical Research Center, in Baton Rouge, and Rhona Apple-
baum, Vice President and Chief Scientific & Regulatory Officer, in Atlanta, until
June 2013 and later Chief Science and Health Officer, of Coca-Cola at the time, and
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Beate Lloyd, Senior Director, Nutrition Center of Expertise, Scientific and
Regulatory Affairs, in Atlanta. The U.S. Right to Know (USRTK, usrtk.org), a
consumer and public health group, obtained the emails and documents. This
organization conducts wide-ranging investigations into the food and agrichemical
industries, examining the health risks of their products, and their public relations,
political and lobbying campaigns. Since its founding in 2015, the USRTK (GR) has
made a series of public requests to assess potential links between Coca-Cola and
public health leaders and academics. For this study, the USRTK sent a state
Freedom of Information request, as permitted by the Louisiana Public Records Act,
on 19 September 2016 to Louisiana State University, in Baton Rouge seeking
emails and other documents exchanged between Professors Church and Katzmarzyk
with Coca-Cola or the American Beverage Association. The USRTK received
responses from Louisiana State University in batches between 23 September and 14
October 2016.
This analysis shows the complexity of the nature of influence itself, and raises the
question of whether existing statements fully capture any influence exerted via ‘‘soft
power’’. If they fail to capture this complexity, does this failure invalidate
statements such as that used by the ISCOLE in its papers?
Coca-Cola’s influence on study design
The emails suggest that the researchers did consult and include Coca-Cola
representatives in making strategic decisions about study design. In the early stages
of planning the study, for example, the parties debated which and how many
countries are to be included. Applebaum emailed Katzmarzyk on 26 March 2012
saying: ‘‘Ok—so with Russia and Finland we are at 13? Or no Finland and at 12.
Seriously–our CEO hates the #13’’ (Appendix 1 in supplementary material; please
see https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41271-017-0095-7). She continued,
Box 1 Coca-Cola’s intention to avoid perception of influencing the study
‘‘With that—I just want to clarify the understanding and agreement we have had regarding ISCOLE
meetings held at The Coca-Cola Company. Asking Peter and/or Tim, also copied herein, to confirm
same
Due to the potential for this very important study to be intentionally distorted by those who have concerns
re our support, it has been agreed that Coca-Cola associates will not to be in attendance at either
meetings of the Advisors or meetings of the PIs/study personnel. By so doing we maintain the integrity
of the statement (below) used in all presentations/publications as well our commitment to published
Conflict of Interest Principles
If there has been a change in thinking pls let me know. The last thing we need is for ISCOLE and/or any
of the scientists associated with same to be challenged and have the study’s and/or the scientists’
integrity/credibility compromised
Many thanks
ISCOLE is funded by The Coca-Cola Company
The study sponsor has no role in study design, data collection, analysis, conclusions or publications
The only sponsor requirement was that the study be global in nature’’
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‘‘Serious about this 13 business. We have no FL [floor?] 13 at Coke’’. Applebaum
asked Katzmarzyk: ‘‘What other country should we look at?’’, to which he
responded, ‘‘We should talk about Russia as well—do you have contacts there
already?’’ (Appendix 1 in supplementary material). Applebaum offered a suggestion
to Church (in which he copied Katzmarzyk) about adding two more countries, but
replies suggest that the researchers were willing to accept her proposals. The ref-
erence to the number 13 should be interpreted in light of the widespread view, in
many western countries, that this number is unlucky. Katzmarzyk wrote to
Applebaum and Church: ‘‘We can work out a more detailed budget if this is
something you would want to pursue’’ (Appendix 2 in supplementary material).
This seeming deference by the researchers to Coca-Cola is apparent in
subsequent exchanges. Katzmarzyk briefed Applebaum on the potential exclusion
of Mexico, noting that it was failing to achieve its study milestones, and presented
options for other countries. He solicited Applebaum’s views on how to proceed,
saying to her: ‘‘Please let us know your thoughts’’ (Appendix 3 in supplementary
material).
Other comments reinforce this apparent willingness by the researchers to please
their funders. For example, Timothy Church of Pennington Biomedical Research
Center wrote to Beate Lloyd (Senior Director of Nutrition) on 11 July 2013: ‘‘we are
grateful for the funding and we value our relationship with the TCCC [The Coca-
Cola Company]. It is very important to me to have a plan that TCCC is happy with
moving forward’’ (Appendix 4 in supplementary material).
In the published protocol for the ISCOLE, no rationale was given for selecting
these particular countries other than to have a wide geographical distribution [12].
Coke’s influence on study progress and publication
The ISCOLE PIs at Pennington kept Coca-Cola informed of their progress and
sought to arrange meetings linked to project milestones at Coca-Cola’s offices. They
seemed particularly keen to ensure maximum publicity for their findings, itself
entirely natural, but in close collaboration with their funder Coca-Cola. Thus,
Church and Katzmarzyk wrote to Applebaum in July 2012 updating them on the
ISCOLE’s progress: ‘‘Tim and I were talking—we would like to come over to
Atlanta for a day to meet with you all—to discuss the media strategy and develop
key talking points on our partnership’’ (Appendix 4 in supplementary material).
Frequent contact between PIs and Coca-Cola create an impression that Coca-
Cola played a role in shaping research presentations. For example, Katzmarzyk
wrote to Applebaum and Church on 19 July 19 2012 about an upcoming
presentation, ‘‘Okay, I have drafted an abstract and an agenda for the symposium.
Comments and edits welcome. PK’’ (Appendix 5 in supplementary material).
Despite these interactions, there seemed to be a clear desire among the
Pennington PIs to avoid potential public perception that Coca-Cola had influenced
the study. For example, Katzymark noted to Applebaum and Church on 7 May 2014
after his presentation, ‘‘See below I just got the evaluation form (sic) my TOS [The
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Obesity Society] presentation last fall: 99% of the 97 people who responded said the
presentation was free of commercial bias!!!’’.
But 5% said that I didn’t present faculty disclosures—which is BS [bullshit—a
derogatory term meaning ‘‘rubbish’’]- I just checked my slide deck and I presented
this at both the beginning and end. Some people may have been asleep’’ (Appendix
6 in supplementary material).
The PIs also seem to have felt the need to have Coca-Cola approve their media
strategy. For example, Katzmarzyk asked Applebaum and Church whether it would
be acceptable to share the ISCOLE slides with a USA Today reporter: ‘‘Okay for me
to share my slides with Nanci Hellmich?’’ A short discussion ensued, then
Applebaum apparently gave her blessings: ‘‘It will be great!’’ (Appendix 7 in
supplementary material).
It is clear that Applebaum did review publications and, at times, stated opinions.
In one instance, Applebaum replied to other Coca-Cola representatives, ‘‘Hi I’m not
comfortable saying this is a study about obesity prevention. Would need to get
approval from the researchers’’ (Appendix 5 in supplementary material).
Coca-Cola’s influence on study acknowledgement
Coca-Cola maintained contractual control over the study’s conflict-of-interest
statements. Quoting the study agreement, ‘‘PBRC agrees that if Sponsor so requests,
and only if Sponsor requests, substantive releases and/or written reports contem-
plated by this Article 6 may include language to the effect that ‘The Study was
funded by Coca-Cola.’’’ (Appendix 8 in supplementary material).
Applebaum exercised this influence, by specifying the desired conflict-of-interest
statement. Katzmarzyk wrote to Applebaum, on 18 January 2013, ‘‘Yes, in the
acknowledgements section—where this is typically done, we have the language
inserted that you wanted (I think) from our meeting with your group in Atlanta:
‘ISCOLE is funded by the Coca-Cola Company. The funder had no role in study
design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the
manuscript.’’’ (Appendix 9 in supplementary material) Applebaum wrote to the
ISCOLE researchers on 4 August 2015 ‘‘I’m proud to say was supported by The
Coca-Cola Company–and that’s it–support only’’ (Appendix 10 in supplementary
material).
Overall, Coca-Cola seemed to be pleased with the ISCOLE. When the journal
Obesity published a paper, entitled ‘‘Relationship between lifestyle behaviours and
obesity in children aged 9–11: Results from a 12-country study’’ in August 2015.
The article concluded that ‘‘behavioural risk factors are important correlates of
obesity in children, including low MVPA (moderate to vigorous physical activity),
short sleep duration and high TV viewing’’. Rhona Applebaum wrote, ‘‘A very
happy day!!…Love the tagline, ‘Global study is first of its kind to survey children
across different cultures.’’’(Appendix 10 in supplementary material).
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Conclusions
Overall, apart from influencing the total number of study sites, we found no evidence
of Coca-Cola exerting ‘hard power’ over the Pennington PIs, where the funder directly
changes core methodological principles or points in the research. However, the email
exchanges appear to convey evidence of Coca-Cola’s exercise of ‘soft power’,
whereby the researchers consistently sought to ensure the funders were satisfied and
sought their guidance on choices of study design, framing and public presentation of
study findings. It is not possible, using documentary analysis, to identify the third face
of power, manipulation, although this should be addressed in future research. That
would, most likely, require empirical research by psychologists.
As with all papers based on Freedom of Information requests, our approach had
several limitations. First, our analysis examines one major grant between Coca-Cola
and the PIs. It is not possible to generalize from this analysis to all conflicts of
interest or even other disclosures on Coca-Cola-funded research. Previous
investigations into recent Coca-Cola-funded research, however, produce similar
findings, including apparent efforts to influence research, suggesting that it may be
part of a broader strategy [13]. Second, much of the analysis here draws on what
was supplied by Louisiana State University and this may be an incomplete sample
of all relevant material. In response to our FOI request on 6 October 2016, an
administrator at the University responded thus: ‘‘Our information technology system
migrated to a new email platform in May 2015. From the point of the migration
forward, any emails that were transferred, written, received or deleted are available
and readily accessible in current email stores. The file transfer included contains
emails that are available and readily. Any emails either archived or deleted prior to
the system migration are not readily accessible and would only be attainable
through a recovery process… Delivery of any resulting data (of which there may be
none) entails a process that could take several weeks to complete, is dependent upon
a successful backup tape restore, and such a process would be ‘‘unreasonably
burdensome or expensive’’. To access this material would be expensive and time-
consuming for Louisiana State University and could require costly and prolonged
legal action by us to exact compliance. That also means that the analysis reported
here, while it advances knowledge beyond previous studies of conflicts of interest
by looking ‘beneath the surface’ at the process of research and collaboration, is
nonetheless incomplete. More generally, further efforts are needed to strengthen and
ensure the integrity of FOI laws as a mechanism for transparency.
The use of the FOI laws is also a double-edged sword. The strategy has proven useful
in exposing wrongdoing in the tobacco, agrichemical, and pharmaceutical industries.
However, corporations may also use FOI requests to influence and stymie the activities
at public institutions. Researchers and funders who fear that every detail of their
correspondence could be made public might be pushed to be more secretive in their
exchanges, making it more difficult in the future to bring any wrongdoing into the light.
Given what we have shown, we are left with one important question. Is the
ISCOLE’s statement, ‘‘The study sponsor has no role in study design, data
collection, analysis, conclusions or publications’’, accurate?
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